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KB

KBS

2 funds◔ Unclaimed
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Disclosures & prior history9 disclosures · worst medium

Material items extracted from the risk-factor, conflicts, and prior-performance sections of KBS's PPMs. Each is quoted verbatim with its source page — surfaced, not editorialized.

Related-party conflict disclosed — Acquisition of properties from affiliated parties — Independent Expert appraisal required

Medium

The Corporation may not purchase or lease properties from the Advisor, a Sponsor, a director, or an Affiliate thereof without Conflicts Committee approval; price may not exceed cost to the affiliated seller unless substantially justified, and in no event may exceed current appraised value by an Independent Expert.

The Corporation may not purchase or lease properties in which the Advisor, a Sponsor, a director or an Affiliate thereof has an interest without a determination by the Conflicts Committee (by majority vote) that such transaction is fair and reasonable to the Corporation and at a price to the Corporation no greater than the cost of the property to the Affiliated seller or lessor unless there is substantial justification for the excess amount. Notwithstanding the preceding sentence, in no event may the Corporation acquire any such property at an amount in excess of its current appraised value as determined by an Independent Expert.
PPM p.2297% confidence

Related-party conflict disclosed — Advisor and Affiliates — Acquisition of Properties from Affiliates

Medium

Corporation may not purchase or lease properties in which Advisor, Sponsor, director or Affiliate has an interest without Conflicts Committee determination that the transaction is fair and reasonable at a price no greater than the affiliated seller's cost, and in no event above current appraised value by Independent Expert.

The Corporation may not purchase or lease properties in which the Advisor, a Sponsor, a director or an Affiliate thereof has an interest without a determination by the Conflicts Committee (by majority vote) that such transaction is fair and reasonable to the Corporation and at a price to the Corporation no greater than the cost of the property to the Affiliated seller or lessor unless there is substantial justification for the excess amount. Notwithstanding the preceding sentence, in no event may the Corporation acquire any such property at an amount in excess of its current appraised value as determined by an Independent Expert.
PPM p.2195% confidence

Related-party conflict disclosed — Advisor compensation and related-party transactions — oversight by Conflicts Committee

Medium

The charter requires Conflicts Committee approval (majority of Independent Directors) for all transactions between the Corporation and the Advisor, Sponsor, directors, or their Affiliates, including property purchases, joint ventures, loans, and advisory compensation. All shares issued to the Advisor, directors, or Affiliates carry restricted voting rights on removal and self-dealing matters.

No shares of Common Stock may be transferred or issued to the Advisor, a director, or any Affiliate thereof unless such prospective stockholder agrees that it will not vote or consent on matters submitted to the Common Stockholders regarding (a) the removal of such Advisor, director or any of its Affiliates or (b) any transaction between the Corporation and any such Advisor, director or any of its Affiliates.
PPM p.2897% confidence

Related-party conflict disclosed — Advisor voting restriction on removal and affiliate transactions

Medium

Shares held by the Advisor, directors and Affiliates are excluded from voting on matters regarding their own removal and on any transactions between the Corporation and such parties, preventing Advisor/Affiliate capture of stockholder votes on self-interested matters.

No shares of Common Stock may be transferred or issued to the Advisor, a director, or any Affiliate thereof unless such prospective stockholder agrees that it will not vote or consent on matters submitted to the stockholders regarding (a) the removal of such Advisor, director or any of its Affiliates or (b) any transaction between the Corporation and any such Advisor, director or any of its Affiliates.
PPM p.2695% confidence

Related-party conflict disclosed — Corporate opportunities — Advisor has no duty to present deals to Corporation

Medium

While externally advised, the Corporation has no interest in any opportunity known to the Advisor unless the Advisor has recommended it to the Corporation, limiting the Corporation's access to deals sourced by the Advisor.

For so long as the Corporation is externally advised by the Advisor or an Affiliate thereof, the Corporation has no interest in any opportunity known to the Advisor unless it has been recommended to the Corporation by the Advisor. The preceding sentence shall be of no consequence except in connection with the application of the corporate opportunity doctrine.
PPM p.2093% confidence

Related-party conflict disclosed — Advisor incentive fee — multi-advisor apportionment and reasonableness standard

Low

Where multiple advisors have served, incentive fees must be apportioned by a proportional method reflecting value added by each advisor. The 15% promote is described as 'presumptively reasonable' but may be exceeded with adequate justification, creating potential for above-threshold compensation.

An interest in the gain from the sale of assets of the Corporation (as opposed to disposition fees, which are the subject of Section 8.5) may be paid to the Advisor or an entity affiliated with the Advisor provided that (a) the interest in the gain must be reasonable, and (b) if multiple Advisors are involved, incentive fees must be distributed by a proportional method reasonably designed to reflect the value added to the Corporation's assets by each respective Advisor and its Affiliates.
PPM p.2193% confidence

Related-party conflict disclosed — Incentive fee apportionment among multiple / successor Advisors

Low

If multiple Advisors have served, incentive fees must be distributed proportionally by time served or by relative fair market value added; this creates a potential conflict where an outgoing Advisor may retain a share of gains on assets held during its tenure.

Distribution of incentive fees to the Advisor or an entity affiliated with the Advisor in proportion to the length of time served as Advisor while such property was held by the Corporation or in proportion to the fair market value of the asset at the time of the Advisor's termination and the fair market value of the asset upon its disposition by the Corporation shall be considered reasonable methods by which to apportion incentive fees.
PPM p.1988% confidence

Related-party conflict disclosed — Roll-Up Transaction — sponsor and advisor compensation continuity risk

Low

Roll-Up Transactions are subject to stockholder protections including appraisal, dissenters' options (cash or stay), and prohibition on transactions that reduce voting rights or impose new impediments to share accumulation; however, the definition of Roll-Up Transaction excludes conversion to corporate form without significant adverse change in Sponsor/Advisor compensation.

The Corporation is prohibited from participating in any proposed Roll-Up Transaction: (a) that would result in the Common Stockholders having voting rights in a Roll-Up Entity that are less than the rights set forth in Article XI hereof; (b) that includes provisions that would operate as a material impediment to, or frustration of, the accumulation of shares by any purchaser of the securities of the Roll-Up Entity ... (d) in which any of the costs of the Roll-Up Transaction would be borne by the Corporation if the Roll-Up Transaction is not approved by the Common Stockholders.
PPM p.2490% confidence

Related-party conflict disclosed — Roll-Up Transaction protections — stockholder rights and cost allocation

Info

The charter prohibits the Corporation from participating in Roll-Up Transactions that would reduce stockholder democracy rights, impede share accumulation, restrict shareholder record access, or impose Roll-Up Transaction costs on the Corporation if the transaction is not approved by Common Stockholders.

The Corporation is prohibited from participating in any proposed Roll-Up Transaction: (i) that would result in the Common Stockholders having democracy rights in a Roll-Up Entity that are less than the rights set forth in Sections 11.1, 11.4, 11.5, 11.6, 11.7, 11.8 and 11.10 hereof; ... (iv) in which any of the costs of the Roll-Up Transaction would be borne by the Corporation if the Roll-Up Transaction is not approved by the Common Stockholders.
PPM p.2695% confidence

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